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COMMENT
AN IMPETUS OF HUMAN WRECKAGE?: THE 1996
AMENDED LANDMINE PROTOCOL
INTRODUCTION
[In] a field hospital in Honduras, .. . I met a young boy who had lost his
leg from a landmine. When I asked him which side in the war had put it
there, he did not know. What difference did it make? Both sides used
landmines. But he was crippled for life, and he was living in the hospital
because he had no place else to go.'
Landmines2 are the weapon of choice for many government and
insurgent groups.' They are cheap, easy to manufacture and use, difficult
to detect, and expensive and dangerous to remove.' After an armed conflict,
the deploying party seldom deplants their explosives; they are left for the
indigenous populations or, more recently, peacekeepers to deal with.5
Landmines cause devastation that has terrorized the world for decades. 6
Each day, landmines hidden beneath the Earth's surface haunt boys and girls
at play, farmers tending their fields, and ordinary travelers.7 Each week,
landmines kill or maim 500 people.8 Each year, millions of new mines are
added to the chilling number of landmines already buried in Asia, Africa,
1. 139 CONG. REC. S9290 (July 22, 1993) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy). Sen. Leahy
recalls that he started the War Victims Fund and sponsored legislation for a landmine moratorium
for people like the Honduran boy. Sen. Leahy notes the psychological pressure of living with
such a threat as follows: "Think of the horror of living day to day in a country where at any
moment you could lose a leg, your life, or your child's life, because of these hidden weapons
[landmines]. Where any open field, or patch of trees, or roadside ditch is a potential death trap.
That is a way of life for tens of millions of people around the world." Id.
2. For the purposes of this Comment, "landmines" and "mines" refer to antipersonnel
landmines, booby-traps, or similar explosive devices, rather than to antiantitank landmines or
water mines. Antipersonnel mines are weapons designed specifically to kill or incapacitate
human beings, as distinguished from other weapons whose function is to destroy or render
vehicles, equipment, or materials ineffective. THE ARMS PROJECT AND PHYSICIANS FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS, LANDMiNES: A DEADLY LEGACY 18 (1993) [hereinafter DEADLY LEGACY].
3. Some insurgent groups are organized in that they exercise governmental authority for a
time over part of the territory of a state. Some insurgent authorities in control of a specific
territory have also entered into agreements with governments and have therefore been considered
to have treaty making capacity.
4. U.S. Dep't of State, Fact Sheet: US. Initiatives For Demining and Landmine Control,
DEP'T OF STATE DISPATCH, Feb. 6, 1995 [hereinafter Landmine Fact Sheet]. It costs between
$150 to $1000 to remove one landmine. Id.
5. Id.
6. President Clinton, Remarks on Admiral Boorda, Landmines (May 17, 1996) (transcript
available from White House Press Office).
7. Id
8. Senator Patrick Leahy, Statement on the Administration's New Landmine Policy,
CONGRESSIONAL- PRESS RELEASE, May 16, 1996. It is estimated that over 28,000 people are
maimed or killed by mines each year. Id.
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Central America, Europe, and the Middle East.9 The current landmine
crisis results not only from the destructive power of landmines, but from the
sheer number of mines accumulated throughout the world. 0
The Landmine Protocol," annexed to the 1980 U.N. Convention on
Conventional Weapons, 12 was the first attempt to cope with the growing
landmine crisis. It was designed to protect civilians from landmine warfare.
The Landmine Protocol proved futile for three reasons: it neglected to
address the fundamental problem of temporal indiscriminateness inherent in
mine warfare, it lacked enforcement mechanisms, and it failed to regulate
either landmine production or transfers.' 3
Landmines are temporally indiscriminate because they lie dormant in the
ground and wait for their victims to trigger their firing mechanisms."' They
are blind weapons that cannot distinguish the "footfall of a soldier and that
of an old aging woman." 5 Landmines are unaware of cease fire and, long
after the fighting has stopped, they can maim or kill the children and
grandchildren of the soldiers who laid them.' 6 Although the Landmine
Protocol prohibits the indiscriminate use of landmines, use is not the heart
of the crisis. The problem is that landmines produce indiscriminate effects
regardless of how they are placed. Since mines are delayed-action weapons,
they are not meant for immediate harm. Because of the time-lag between
when mines are laid and when they explode, mines frequently strike
civilians. 11
The Landmine Protocol is silent with regard to these indiscriminate
effects. Mines deployed within the boundaries of the Landmine Protocol will
outlast their military purpose and will cause future harm to civilians. The
humanitarian tragedy of suffering and casualties will be their only lasting
effect.
9. There are over 100 million mines buried in these regions. Id. "It is estimated that Angola
has between 10 million and 20 million landmines scattered in the countryside after two decades
of civil war between the Angolan government and UNITA." Two UN. Peacekeepers, Angolan
Hurt in Mine Accident, REuTERS N. AM. WIRE, June 17, 1996. Approximately two million
landmines were buried during a 16 year civil war in Mozambique. See 30,000 Landmines
Removed in Mozambique, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, June 12, 1996.
10. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 3.
11. Final Act, U.N. Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons, at Appendix C (Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices), U.N. Doc. A/Conf.95/15/Annex 1 (1980) [hereinafter
Landmine Protocol].
12. Final Act, U.N. Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons, Appendix A (Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects), U.N. Doc. AICONF.95/15/Annex I (1980) [hereinafter Weapons
Convention].
13. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 8.
14. Id. at 3.
15. Id. at 3.
16. Id. at 3.
17. Id. at 5.
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Secondly, neither the Weapons Convention nor the Landmine Protocol
contain enforcement mechanisms. I" Absent provisions of liability for
breaches of the Protocol, blatant violations go unpunished.19 For example,
approximately 65 million of the 100 million uncleared landmines around the
world have been laid since the Landmine Protocol has been in force.'
Finally, the 1980 Landmine Protocol is silent on issues of landmine
production and transfer. As a result, several states have themselves
employed moratoriums on antipersonnel landmines. In October 1992, the
United States adopted such a unilateral export moratorium. This led to U.S.
resolutions calling for moratoria on exports of landmines that pose grave
risks to civilians. 21 A 1994 resolution called for the eventual elimination
of antipersonnel landmines. 2
The instrument's silence regarding indiscriminate effects, enforcement
mechanisms, and landmine production and transfer resulted in an internation-
al plea for a global ban on landmines.Y In response to this plea, the French
government requested an international conference to review the Weapons
Convention and its annexed Landmine Protocol.' On December 22, 1993,
States Parties to the Weapons Convention submitted the same request to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations.25
The Secretary-General subsequently established the Review Conference
of the States Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be
Excessively Injurious Or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. At the first plenary
meeting, from September 25-October 13, 1995, the Conference resulted in
failed negotiations regarding the Landmine Protocol and concluded that more
time was needed.' On May 3, 1996, when the second Review Conference
ended, disappointment was felt around the world. The amended Landmine
Protocol failed to reflect the international public opinion to ban landmines
18. Landmine Protocol, supra note 11, art. 3, para. 3.
19. Janet E. Lord, Legal Restraints in the Use of Landmines: Humanitarian and
Environmental Crisis, 25 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 311 , 345 (Spring, 1995).
20. Landmine Fact Sheet, supra note 4.
21. Landmine Fact Sheet, supra note 4. Senator Patrick J. Leahy sponsored legislation to
impose a one year moratorium on the sale, transfer and export abroad by the U.S. of
antipersonnel landmines, and to provide funds for demaining efforts. He led the General
Assembly to extend the moratorium for three years. He was also the mastermind behind
Landmines: A Deadly Legacy put out by The Arms Project. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at
xi.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 5.
24. Landmine Protocol, supra note 11, art. 8. Pursuant to Article 8, the Weapons
Convention permits the contracting parties to review the scope and operation and make changes,
if necessary, to the Weapons Convention and any of its Protocols.
25. Final Report, Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions
or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be
Excessively Injurious Or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, at 4, U.N. Doc. CCW/CONF.I/16 I
(Part I)(1996) [hereinafter Review Conference].
26. Review Conference, supra note 25, at 6.
1996]
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altogether.
Historically, the initial 1980 Landmine Protocol was then positive step
towards the codification and development of the law of landmine warfare.
While it filled a major gap that existed in humanitarian law,' it proved
futile over time. The participants of the Review Conference were presented
with a historic opportunity to ban landmine use altogether. The Conference's
result, however, was merely a more detailed and restrictive version of the
1980 Landmine Protocol.
Part I of this Comment briefly discusses the tactical and strategic value
of landmines and discusses the humanitarian consequences in terms of
medical, social, environmental, and economic costs throughout the world.
Part II examines international law governing landmine use prior to the
Review Conference with an emphasis on the original Landmine Protocol.
Part III discusses the events leading to the Review Conference as well as the
final amendments regulating not only landmine use, but also production and
transfer. Part IV analyzes the effectiveness of the amended Landmine
Protocol as applied to the growing landmine crisis. This comment concludes
that, although tighter restrictions have been placed on the use, production,
and transfer of landmines, the Landmine Protocol will yet fail to safeguard
the civilians of the world.
I. A "SLOW MOTION" WEAPON OF MASS DESTRUCTION
Landmines are viably characterized as a slow motion weapon of mass
destruction. 2 These devices work in slow motion because it is the gradual
accumulation of mines that creates the potential for mass destruction. 29
Mines may not initially evoke the nightmarish visions of warfare like
biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons, but their effect is the same: they
are all indiscriminate weapons that cause excessive deaths and insufferable
injuries. They have as well the potential for massive long-term devasta-
tion.30
A. The Evolution of Landmine Use: From Tactics to Strategics
Landmines may be the most ancient weapons on the United States' our
arms control agenda.3 During both World War I and World War II, they
27. Lieutenant Colonel Burris M. Camahan, The Law of Land Mine Warfare: Protocol II
to the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 105 MIL. L. REv. 73, 94
(1984)[hereinafter Carnahan].
28. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 3. The Arms Project, a division of the Human Rights
Watch, commonly refers to the accumulation of landmines as a "slow motion weapon of mass
destruction." This coined phrase has been adopted universally by the international community.
29. Id. at 11.
30. Id. at 12.
31. U.S. Dep't of State, Hidden Killers: US. Policy on Anti-personnel Landmines, DEP'T
OF STATE DISPATCH, Feb. 6, 1995 [hereinafter Hidden Killers].
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were primarily used as obstacles to enemy movement.32 For example,
troops would seed their antitank3 minefields with antipersonnel landmines
to hinder the enemy from clearance attempts, thereby causing delay .31 But
today, the role of landmines has become two-fold. Because we live in a time
when war is waged increasingly against civilians, 35 a once purely defensive
tactical battlefield weapon has expanded to an offensive strategic theaterwide
weapon.36 This section explains both the defensive and offensive uses of
landmines and concludes that modern conventional military operations and
technological developments have caused a dramatic and fundamental
expansion of landmine use.37
1. The Traditional Approach: Defensive Tactics
Landmines are deployed defensively in several ways. First, they are
used to impede enemy access to certain areas of land by requiring mine
clearance before those areas may be traveled or occupied.38 Minefields are
also commonly laid to protect areas from expected enemy attack. Such areas
might include the perimeters of key economic installations, villages, towns,
and countries. 3
2. The Modern Approach: Offensive Strategies
While originally invented as a defensive device to impede advancing
armies, mines are increasingly being deployed as offensive weapons.4
Placement around the perimeters of villages and towns can serve an
32. Carnahan, supra note 27, at 75-76.
33. An antitank mine refers to mines whose function is to destroy or render vehicles,
equipment, or materials ineffective. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 17.
34. Id. at 21.
35. Hidden Killers, supra note 31.
36. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 23.
37. See id. at 33.
38. Carnahan, supra note 27, at 75.
39. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LANDMINES IN MOZAMBIQUE 28-31 (1994) [hereinafter
MOZAMBIQUE]. During the continuous war in Mozambique from the 1960 until 1992, combatants
on all sides used landmines. The Mozambican government used antipersonnel mines to protect
hospitals, clinics, bridges, dams, factories, and water pipelines. The government also laid
protective and nuisance minefields around the perimeters of towns and municipal centers where
attacks were expected. Id. at 31. In 1990, an extensive minefield was laid to act as a barrier to
an expected coalition attack from Turkey during the Gulf War. MIDDLE EAST WATCH, A
DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HIDDEN DEATH: LANDMINES AND CIVILIAN CASUALTIES
IN IRAQI KURDISTAN 32 (1992) [hereinafter HIDDEN DEATH]. Presently, the United States is
laying almost a million mines necessary to delay and disrupt a mass infantry attack on Seoul by
North Korean troops long enough for U.S. airpower to get into Seoul and be fully effective.
President Clinton, Secretary of State Warren Christopher, and Secretary of Defense Bill Perry,
Remarks at News Conference on the Policy on Landmine Use by the Military (May 16, 1996)
(transcript available from Federal News Service).
40. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 22. Mines are now used mainly in civil wars, by
developing countries. Landmines. Treading Gingerly, ECONOMIST, Apr. 27, 1996, at 46.
1996]
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offensive, as well as defensive, measure. For example, during the recent
Cambodian conflict, government troops placed mines around the perimeters
of enemy villages, then bombarded the villages with artillery fire so that the
"enemy"-mainly noncombatant civilians-were forced to flee into the
minefields. 4' The use of landmines as an offensive weapon alters their role
from that of a limited utility, tactical weapon used on a particular battlefield
in support of other weapons systems (especially antitank mines) to that of a
strategic weapon. 42
The intentional targeting of civilians is perhaps the most horrifying
offensive use of mines."3  Mines have been used deliberately to terrorize
and control civilians. For instance, in Thailand, mines planted around a
refugee camp are used to prevent refugees from leaving at night." Mines
strewn in farmlands and paddyfields, in schoolyards, and on country roads
make entire villages uninhabitable.' The mere threat of mines can also be
used as a kind of psychological warfare against civilians.'
Route denial and ambush mining are other forms of offensive deploy-
ment. 7 Route denial consists of planting mines on major supply roads and
rural tracks in an attempt to deny such routes to opposing forces." Roads
and tracks strewn with mines also facilitate ambushes. Interlinking mines,
so that the point man passes several devices before triggering a mine, ensures
that the remaining members of the patrol are within the killing zone of the
mine pattern.49 Other types of ambushes consist of blocking tracks to
channel pedestrians and vehicles into mined areas ° Mines are also used
to attack people trying to escape or take cover at ambush sites."
3. Technological Advancement
In addition to the expanded tactical use of landmines, the technological
advances in landmine design has also increased their destructive capabili-
ties.52 Technological advances include remotely delivered systems 3 low
41. Id. at 22-23.
42. Id. at 22.
43. Id. Mines deployed against civilians are also a flagrant violation of international law.
Id. at 23.
44. Thailand: Army to Show Renegades No Mercy, BANGKOK POST, Feb. 9, 1996.
45. Hidden Killers, supra note 31.
46. MozAMBIQUE, supra note 39, at 28. For example, in the Gorongosa region of
Mozambique, civilians were told that areas were heavily mined, when in fact they were not. Id.
at 29.
47. Id. at 29.
48. Id. Antipersonnel mines surround antitank mines in order to hinder clearance attempts.
49. Id. at 30. This technique is called a "patrol trap."
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 33.
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metal content,5 4 sophisticated electronic sensors," self-destructing ,56 and
self-neutralizing mechanisms.57 These advances render mines even more
destructive to civilian populations. s5
B. Military Benefits vs. Humanitarian Costs
Given the ease of defensive and offensive strategics, there are a number
of military benefits. Such benefits include hindering, delaying, and directing
troop movement while denying access to large tracts of land, military bases,
and key installations. 9 Mines are designed deliberately to maim without
killing in order to burden an enemy's medical organization and undermine
troop morale. 60
A few military disadvantages, however, do detract from the military
benefits of landmines. Often, troops find themselves victims of their own
minefields. For example, U.S. deployed mines killed approximately one
third of the U.S. forces in Vietnam while they killed relatively few of the
enemy in exchange.' Studies of mine use in the last decade show that, in
the aggregate, the military value of landmines is short-lived and quite
inconsequential when compared with the ongoing wreckage they cause.62
But aside from such military detriments, senseless humanitarian costs are
the real scourge of landmines. Individual, communal, and overall
socio-economical costs are exorbitant prices to pay in contrast with the
53. "Remotely delivered mines" are landmines delivered via machinery to a remote location
in a very short period of time. This may be done through the use of rockets, artillery, or aerial
drops which serve to place landmines in a distant area of an enemy's territory. Peter J. Eckberg,
Note, Remotely Delivered Landmines and International Law, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 149,
150 (1995)[hereinafter Eckberg]. See also DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 26.
54. Mines with a low metal content are often extremely difficult to detect and deactivate or
destroy. Apparently, some truly all-plastic mines are now being produced. DEADLY LEGACY,
supra note 2, at 27.
55. Mine fuzing sensors and their associated microprocessors can be used to discriminate
between the movement of animals and humans or to count the number of passers-by before a
mine will detonate. Id. at 28.
56. A mine with a self-destructing mechanism will automatically explode after a pre-set
period of time. Id.
57. A mine with a self-neutralizing mechanism is designed to turn itself off after a set
period of time. Id. at 29.
58. Id. at 26.
59. Id at 21. Modem conventional military tactics depend largely upon speed of movement
and maneuver, coupled with firepower, to defeat an enemy. A defender will therefore see any
time delay or physical hindrance that can be imposed upon an enemy as an advantage. In this
regard, landmines hinder the movement of an enemy and its access to large tracts of land,
military bases, and key installations. Landmines are also used to direct enemy troops toward an
area where the defender is best able to defeat them.
60. Id. at 22. An injured soldier in a minefield crying for help can demoralize his comrades.
Moreover, his commander will often be obliged to deploy other troops to rescue him and possibly
slow down military operations. Id.
61. Id. at 21-22. Even with this data, the Army continued to ask for more mines.
62. Id. at 272.
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military value of landmines. Individual costs include medical, physical,
mental, and labor disabilities.
The medical consequences of mine blasts are traumatic. If not killed
immediately by explosives, victims will often die in the fields from loss of
blood or lack of medical transport.63 If death does not ensue, surgical
amputation"M typically results from ravaging wounds.6 If victims are
fortunate enough to receive medical treatment, they require antibiotics, large
amounts of blood, and extended hospital stays.' 6 The survivor amputees
require mental therapy, physical therapy, and prosthetic devices to lead
normal and productive lives.67 Most mine blasts, however, occur in
developing countries where scarce resources make even ordinary medical
treatment difficult to supply. Most mine victims will therefore never receive
these services.6
Aside from physical disabilities, victims suffer severe social hardship,
particularly during their social reintegration process.69 The societies in
which the majority of landmine victims live are agrarian or pastoral, where
survival means muscle power.70 An amputee is often viewed as unproduc-
tive and simply another mouth to feed.7' They must learn to cope with
social rejection and discrimination from their families and society as a
whole. 2
Victims may feel like a burden on their families 73-a valid feeling,
considering that the relatives of a mine victim often must assume the total
burden of care.74 Spouses of amputees may eventually abandon them to
seek more productive, able-bodied partners.75 Unmarried young men and
women fear that they will not find a partner because of their disability.76
Amputees not only suffer from severe social hardships but are also
63. Id. at 118.
64. Id. at 117. Surgery can be extremely problematic due to the severity and degree of
contamination. The surgeon's task is to cut away all of the dead and severely damaged tissue
and remove debris and dirt, a process called debridement. Id. at 121.
65. Mines damage the body either by blast or by driving dirt, bacteria, clothing, and metal
and plastic fragments into the tissue and bone, often causing severe secondary infections.
Damage is rarely confined to one leg. Damage can be found to the second leg, other limbs, the
genitals, chest, and face. Id. at 121.
66. Id. at 117.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. MOZAMBIQuE, supra note 39, at 72.
70. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 117.
71. Id. at 131.
72. MOZAMBIQuE, supra note 39, at 72-75.
73. Id. at 75.
74. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 131.
75. MozAMBiQuE, supra note 39, at 74; DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 132.
76. MOZAMBIQE, supra note 39, at 74-75.
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discriminated against in the workplace.' They are often fired after falling
victim to a landmine.78 Some are fortunate enough to receive final
compensation before being fired.79
Because of the lack of support from families and communities, landmine
victims must try to survive in any way they can.' Despite their disabilities,
amputees may try to continue to produce crops. Others with basic educations
may try to find secretarial work, but office jobs are scarce.8' Amputees
may drift into the larger towns where they become beggars or petty
criminals.' 2 Consequently, many die of malnutrition because they are
ill-equipped to make a living.3
The effects on community life can be equally devastating.A4 Mines
serve to impede enemy movement in war, but in times of peace, uncleared
landmines are obstacles to post war and economic development. In some
cases, mines render land completely uninhabitable. They inhibit refugee
repatriation. 5 Conversely, communities will often disintegrate as villagers
fearful of encountering mines abandon their farms to live in other villages. 6
With peace, communities already shattered by war must rebuild their homes
and villages, find new pastures and farmland, and seek out new markets for
their goods-all with the continuing threat of landmines. s
The damage to the economic infrastructure of a country is quite
significant. During civil strife or regional conflict, it is common to lay
mines around railways, electric plants and powerlines, key road nets, water
treatment plants, and government buildings." s These are key installations
required to support a rebuilding economy. 9 As a result, economic
reconstruction is delayed until the mines can be cleared.'
Most postwar countries in the developing world, however, have neither
77. Id. at 74.
78. Id. at 74. Case Study: S.A. was fired in 1992, after he had been maimed by a landmine
and the company paid no compensation. S.A wrote a complaint to the provincial department of
employment, but has received no answer.
79. Id. at 74. Case Study: R.S. was a tractor driver at the Empresa di Citrinos de Chmoio.
In 1980, while driving a tractor in an orange tree plantation, the vehicle hit an antitank mine.
He lost his left leg. After his accident, the Empresa de Citrinos paid him a substantial amount
of money, and fired him.
80. Id. at 73.
81. Id. at 75.
82. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 132. A beggar in Maputo describes why he spends
all day begging, "I have to survive so I spend the day outside here asking [for] money."
MOZAMBIQUE, supra note 39, at 74.
83. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 288.
84. Id. at 132.
85. Id. at 134.
86. Id. at 133.
87. Id. at 132-33.
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the economic nor organizational infrastructure to support a large scale mine
clearance operation. 9' This leaves their fate in the hands of the international
community.' As the Kurdish author, Hussain Arif, once wrote, "we have
come so close but so many things conspire against us, and now these mines,
this blight in our fields-they will surely kill our dream, even if we are
successful in all our other efforts." The obvious humanitarian wreckage thus
exceeds not only the military benefits of landmines but also their military
intent. Given the weight of the humanitarian costs, the military benefits of
landmine use justifiably deserve the international plea for the global ban of
landmines and the universal demand for action by the United Nations.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW GOVERNING LANDMINES PRIOR
TO THE REVIEW CONFERENCE
The Landmine Protocol devolves from international humanitarian law,
also called the law of war. The law of war traditionally governed the
unnecessary harshness of armed conflict between states. Although this
humanitarian law has roots in customary international law,93 much of it has
been codified in a variety of treaties." This section first addresses custom-
ary international laws applicable to landmine use. It then sets forth the
various treaties that govern the weapon.
A. Customary International Law
Customary international law limits the means by which parties to a
conflict wage war. 9 It prohibits states from using weapons which cause
unnecessary suffering and superfluous injury96 and it prohibits indiscrimi-
nate and direct attacks against noncombatants.' Customary law also
requires that the military value derived from the use of a weapon outweigh
91. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 134. The United Nations has estimated the costs of
clearance, including support and logistics costs, at somewhere between $300 and $1000 a mine.
Most antipersonnel mines, however, cost less than $25, and some less than $3. Id.
92. As the Kurdish author, Hussain Arif wrote, "we have always had our dream, freedom,
self determination, a voice in our future-this is the Kurdish dream." HIDDEN DEATH, supra note
39, introductory quotation.
93. General practices of states that gradually obtain universal recognition as law evolve into
customary international law. Norman B. Smith, A Plea For the Total Ban of Land Mines By
International Treaty, 17 Loy. L.A. INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 507, 513 (Apr. 1995)[hereinafter Smith].
94. States may choose to codify customary law in international treaties. It is important to
note, however, that it is not the treaty that gives the legal status to custom. Customary law
governs all. In addition to codifying customary law in treaties, states may also expressly agree
to bind themselves to specific rights and duties. See Smith, supra note 93.
95. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 306; JEAN PICTET, DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPLES
OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 163 (1985) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES]; HIDDEN DEATH,
supra note 39, at 56.
96. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 306.
97. PRINCIPLES, supra note 95, at 76.
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its humanitarian costs. 9 In addition to the above principles, customary law
requires that in cases not covered by treaties, principles of humanity, and
public conscience will serve as protection to civilians and combatants. 99
The above variant was first codified by the 1899 Hague Convention and is
embodied in most subsequent humanitarian law instruments. 100
B. Treaty Law Prior to the Weapons Convention
The St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868101 was the first treaty to
prohibit the use of specific weapons. The drafters noted that the employment
of arms which uselessly aggravate human suffering is contrary to the laws of
humanity. 2 In anticipation of the inevitable effect of modern weapon
technology, they specifically acknowledged the possibility of drawing up new
agreements in order to maintain the principles established in the Declara-
tion. 103
The customary principle of eliminating weapons which cause unnecessary
suffering and superfluous injury is also the premise of the First Hague Peace
Conference of 1899, as well as the Second Hague Peace Conference of
1907. 14 Furthermore, the Hague Agreements were the first international
treaties to codify the customary rule regarding the employment of warfare:
the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not
unlimited.0" The Law of the Hague was an early attempt to develop laws
98. PRINCIPLES, supra note 95, at 76; See also FRITS KALSHOVEN, CONSTRAINTS ON THE
WAGING OF WAR 15 (1987) [hereinafter CONSTRAINTS]; MOZAMBIQUE, supra note 39, at 109.
99. CONSTRAINTS, supra note 98, at 14; PRINCIPLES, supra note 95, at 60. See also
HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: CHALLENGES AHEAD 112 (Astrid J.M. Delissen &
Gerard J. Tanja, eds., 1991) [hereinafter CHALLENGES AHEAD]. ("One could also mention the
famous finding by the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal that, by 1939, the Hague
Regulations had passed (the Martens Clause) into custom and thus becoming binding on parties
and non-parties alike.") The Martens Clause reads in its entirety:
In cases not covered by the Conventions, civilians and combatants remain under the
protection and the authority of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from
established usages, from the principles of humanity, and the dictates of public
conscience.
Id.
100. CHALLENGES AHEAD, supra note 99, at 116. The Weapons Convention embodies the
Martens Clause into its preamble. Weapons Convention, supra note 12.
101. Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400
Grammes Weight, Dec. 11, 1868, 1 A.J.I.L. Supp. 95 (1907), reprinted in BURNS H. WESTON
ET AL., BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 128(1990) [hereinafter
St. Petersburg Declaration].
102. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 312.
103. Id. at 313. The Declaration banned the use in war of projectiles weighing less than
400 grams which are either explosive or inflammable.
104. Id. at 313; CONSTRAINTS, supra note 98, at 29 [hereinafter Law of the Hague or Hague
Agreements].
105. CONSTRAINTS, supra note 98, at 29.
11
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which civilized countries would agree to follow in times of war.l°6
The 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of
Warfare 7 is analogous to the above international agreements because it
also prohibits weapons that cause unnecessary suffering. 08  The 1925
Geneva Protocol, however, goes one step further from the previous
agreements in that it prohibits warfare that is inherently indiscriminate in its
effect." In 1972, the Biological Weapons Convention"0  supplemented
the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The Biological Weapons Convention was the first
international agreement to ban not just use, but the production, stockpiling,
and transfer of a specific weapon type."'
The four Geneva Conventions of 1949 redefined and redeveloped the
Law of the Hague." 2 Thus far, the Law of the Hague, as well as the other
conventions regarding wars, were literally applicable to just that-wars
between States." 3  The Geneva Conventions serve as the first treaties
expressly to provide protection for all those who, as a consequence of armed
conflict, have fallen into the hands of the adversary."' Inhabitants of
106. Lord, supra note 19, at 326 n.113.
107. 1925 Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating,
Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T.
571, 94 L.N.T.S 65, reprinted in BuRNS H. WESTON ET AL., BASIC DOCUMENTs IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 136 (1990) [hereinafter 1925 Geneva Protocol].
108. Id.
109. CONSTRAINTS, supra note 98, at 30; DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 314.
110. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26
U.S.T. 583, T.I.A.S. No. 8062, reprinted in BURNs H. WESTON ET AL., BASIC DOCUMENTS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 211 (1990).
111. Id.
112. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 74 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention for Amelioration
of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; these four
conventions are reprinted in BURNS H. WESTON ET AL., BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND WORLD ORDER 147-80 (1990) [hereinafter Geneva Conventions]; CONSTRAINTS, supra
note 98, at 10.
113. See also St. Petersburg Declaration, supra note 101; 1925 Geneva Protocol, supra note
107.
114. CONSTRAINTS, supra note 98, at 40; Geneva Conventions, supra note 112, art. 3;
Article 3 reads in its entirety:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be
bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
(I) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of
armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat
by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances
be treated humanely, without adverse distinction founded on race, colour,
religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this end,
the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place
12
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occupied territory as well as enemy civilians in the territory of a belligerent
party are protected."l5
In time, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 began to manifest
shortcomings."16  The simple treaty provisions of the Laws of the Hague
and the Geneva Conventions were outdated by sophisticated developments in
the techniques of warfare (such as the innovations in the sphere of
landmines). The provisions became blatantly incapable of providing the
civilian population with adequate protection against the dangers arising from
military operations." 7
The Geneva Diplomatic Conference on Humanitarian Law, which met
from 1974-1977, proved successful because it clarified the precise prohibi-
tions and restrictions that States were prepared to accept." 8 The Diplomat-
ic Conference produced two Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions.' 9 Protocol I is the predecessor to the Landmine Protocol.
Notably, many provisions of Protocol I simply codified pre-existing rules of
customary international law relating to the methods and means of war-
fare."2  Such provisions limited the scope of warfare,' forbade weap-
ons that cause superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering,' 22 prohibited
direct" and indiscriminate attacks'24  against civilians, and prohibited
whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation,
cruel treatment and torture;(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all
the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized
people.
Id.
115. CONSTRAINTS, supra note 98, at 10-11.
116. Id. at 11.
117. Id. at 35.
118. Id. at 36.
119. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict, June 8, 1977, 1977 U.N. Jurid. Y.B.
95, reprinted in BuRNS H. WESTON ET AL., BAsIC DOCUMENTs IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
WORLD ORDER 230-246 (1990) [hereinafter Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflict, June 8, 1977, 1977 U.N. Jurid. Y.B. 135, reprinted in BURNS H. WESTON ET
AL., BASIC DOCUMENTs IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 247-252 (1990)[hereinafter Protocol 11]; CONSTRAINTS, supra note 98, at 71.
120. CONSTRAINTS, supra note 98, at 71; Eckberg, supra note 53, at 161-162. "The
protections provided for in Protocol I marked great strides by codifying several of the customary
principles of international law dealing with rules of war; however, the effectiveness of the
agreement is limited because only a small number of nations are parties to the agreement." Id.
at 162.
121. Protocol 1, supra note 119, art. 35, para. 1.
122. Id. art. 35, para. 2.
123. Id. art. 51, para. 2.
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methods of warfare which may cause widespread, long-term severe damage
to the natural environment."z
Other provisions clarified previously vague principles regarding the
protection of the civilian population against the effects of hostilities. 26
Protocol I required that parties to a conflict distinguish between civilians and
combatants, as well as civilian objects and military objects. 7 It further
mandated that the parties operations be directed only against military
operations. 12 Protocol I also took the ambiguity out of the word "civil-
ian," requiring that in case of doubt, the presumption must be that the person
is a civilian. 129
Protocol I additionally obligated the High Contracting Parties to
determine whether a new method of warfare would be prohibited by the
Protocol or by any other rule of international law. 3° Finally, Protocol I
illustrated the importance of the protection of civilians failing to release legal
obligations with respect to civilians when another party to the conflict
violates Protocol 1.131
The general principles of the law of war as set forth in Protocol I were
clear. But in relation to landmines in particular, Protocol I was flawed. Its
provisions were too general and broadly drafted to suitably address the
concerns raised by the widespread use of the weapon.'32
C. The Weapons Convention
The Diplomatic Conference, in addition to drafting the 1977 Additional
Protocols, formed an Ad Hoc committee on weapons to confront the issue of
specific limitations on landmines and booby-traps.133 Although new
limitations were politically and technologically necessary, the Conference was
unable to come to an agreement. 34 The subject was passed to the United
Nations General Assembly. The General Assembly convened the Conference
on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
124. Id. art. 51, para. 4(5).
125. Id. art. 35, para. 3.
126. CONSTRAINTS, supra note 98, at 71; Protocol I, supra note 119, Part IV.
127. Protocol I, supra note 119, art. 48.
128. Id. art. 48.
129. Id. art. 50, para. 1.
130. Id. art. 36.
131. Id. art. 51, para. 8.
132. Lord, supra note 19, at 329; DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 285.
133. Carnahan, supra note 27, at 75. The sudden interest in restricting landmines and other
"delayed action weapons" arose for both political and technical reasons. Politically, the rise of
international terrorism in the 1960s and 1970s stimulated efforts to curb some of the terrorists'
favorite weapons, booby-traps, and time bombs. On the technical side, the development of
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Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscrimi-
nate Effects. 35 After two sessions, the participants reached an agreement
commonly referred to as the Weapons Convention. 36  The Weapons
Convention applied to "dubious weapons,"' 37 dubious because either the
weapons themselves or the manner in which they are used are not in
accordance with the principles of humanitarian law of armed conflict. 3 '
The participants' views at the Conference varied widely. 3 9  As a
result, the Weapons Convention itself was an extremely general agree-
ment."4 It contained eleven articles that dealt with matters such as scope
of application, entry into force and revisions.' 4' Its three annexed Proto-
cols (Protocol I on "Non-Detectable Fragments," 42 Protocol II on "Prohi-
bitions or Restrictions of the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devic-
es," 43 and Protocol III on "Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Incendiary Weapons"") contained the substantive aspects of the possible
135. Id.
136. Weapons Convention, supra note 12.
137. The term is coined by the distinguished Dutch Professor, Bert Roling. CONSTRAINTS,
supra note 98, at 147.
138. Id. As mentioned above, these principles include prohibitions against using weapons
that cause unnecessary suffering and superfluous injury and indiscriminate and direct attacks
against noncombatants. The principles also require the military value derived from the use of
a weapon outweigh its humanitarian costs. PRINCIPLES, supra note 95, at 76.
139. CONSTRAINTS, supra note 98, at 147. "To give just one example: while some
delegations favoured a categorical ban on all possible uses of incendiary weapons, other
delegations saw no reason to protect combatants from the impact of such weapons, and they were
not even convinced of the need to add the rules already laid down in Protocol I of 1977 on
protection of the civilian population, any specific rules protecting civilians against the use of
incendiary weapons." Id.
140. The Weapons Convention was drafted in general terms because the participants were
uncertain as to whether the individual States would be prepared to accept all the prohibitions and
restrictions they would be able to agree upon. CONSTRAINTS, supra note 98, at 147.
141. Weapons Convention, supra note 12. Art. 8 reads in its entirety:
(a) At any time after the entry into force of this Convention any High Contracting Party
may propose amendments to this Convention or any annexed Protocol by which it is bound.
Any proposal for an amendment shall be communicated to the Depositary, who shall notify
it to all the High Contracting Parties and shall seek their views on whether a conference
should be convened to consider the proposal. If a majority, that shall not be less than
eighteen of the High Contracting Parties so agree, he shall promptly convene a conference
to which all High Contracting Parties shall be invited. States not parties to this Convention
shall be invited to the conference as observers.
(b) Such a conference may agree upon amendments which shall be adopted and shall
enter into force in the same manner as this Convention and the annexed Protocols,
provided that amendments to this Convention may be adopted only by the High
Contracting Parties and that amendments to a specific annexed Protocol may be
adopted only by the High Contracting Parties are bound by that Protocol.
142. Final Act, U.N. Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons, at Appendix B (Protocol On Non-Detectable Fragments), U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.95/15/Annex I (1980).
143. Landmine Protocol, supra note 11.
144. Final Act, U.N. Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons, at Appendix D (Protocol On Prohibitions or Restrictions of the Use of
Incendiary Weapons), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.95/15/Annex I (1980)[hereinafter Protocol III).
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uses of certain conventional weapons. 45
The Weapons Convention, as evidenced in the preamble, was narrowly
tailored to principles of humanitarian law of armed conflict.4 6 In reaffirm-
ing the need to continue the codification of customary international law, the
Weapons Convention recalled "the general principles of the protection of the
civilian population against the effects of hostilities" as well as principles of
unnecessary suffering and protection of the environment which derive
directly from Protocol I of 1977.147
The Conference, however, failed to agree on several subjects. This led
to the absence of specific rules (such as the use of incendiary weapons
against combatants). 4s  To ensure protection against the absence of
rules, 49 the High Contracting Parties, embodied the customary law
requiring that in cases not governed by the convention, civilians and
combatants remain under the protection of the principles of humanity.15°
D. 1980 Landmine Protocol
The purpose of the 1980 Landmine Protocol was to adapt customary
humanitarian principles, particularly those expressed in 1977 Additional
Protocol I, to the peculiar vagaries of landmine use.15' While a salutary
attempt towards the regulation of mine warfare, the Landmine Protocol
contained numerous flaws. An amalgamation of balancing tests, exceptions,
limitations, and loopholes rendered it ineffective.
1. Scope
The material scope related to the use of mines, booby-traps, and other
devices on land.'52 As part of the Weapons Convention, the Landmine
Protocol applied in the same situations as the Geneva Convention Common
145. CONSTRAINTS, supra note 98, at 148.
146. Weapons Convention, supra note 12, preamble.
147. Id.
148. CONSTRAINTS, supra note 98, at 148.
149. Weapons Convention, supra note 12, preamble.
150. Martens Clause defined. See CHALLENGES AHEAD, supra note 99 at 116.
151. MOZAMBIQUE, supra note 39, at 110; DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 304. The
Landmine Protocol additionally deals with booby-traps and other similar devices. For purposes
of this Comment, article 6, which deals exclusively with booby-traps will not be discussed.
Landmine Protocol, supra note 11, art. 6.
152. Article I provides: "This Protocol relates to the use on land of the mines, booby-traps
and other devices defined herein, including mines laid to interdict beaches, waterway crossings
or river crossings, but does not apply to the use of anti-ship mines at sea or in inland
waterways." Landmine Protocol, supra note 11, art. 1. Article 2 defines: 'Mine' means any
munition placed under, on or near the ground or other surface area and designed to be detonated
or exploded by the presence, proximity or contact of a person or vehicle, and 'remotely delivered
mine' means any mine so defined delivered by artillery, rocket, mortar, or similar means or
dropped from an aircraft." Id. art. 2, para. 1.
[Vol. 27
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Article 2 and the Additional Protocol I, which included international conflicts
and fighting against colonial domination, alien occupation, and racist
regimes."' Because of this limited scope, the Landmine Protocol was
effectively irrelevant to the internal armed conflicts in which landmines are
chiefly used.' 4
2. General Restrictions
At the heart of the Landmine Protocol were general restrictions of mine
use set forth to protect civilians and non-combatants.' The Landmine
Protocol not only prohibited the direct use of mines against civilians, I 6 but
it also purported to prohibit their indiscriminate use.'57 However, the
instrument ignored the basic problem of temporal indiscriminateness inherent
in landmine use: the effect of mines that outlast their military purpose cause
future risks to civilians.' The Arms Project appropriately concluded:
The Landmines Protocol thus fails on its own terms to provide adequate
protection from this indiscriminate quality. This reflects the failure of its
authors to make the analytical distinction between indiscriminate weapon
use (which can be minimized if combatants take care to distinguish military
targets from civilians) and the indiscriminate effects that naturally result
153. Geneva Conventions, supra note 112, art. 2. Protocol I, supra note 119, art. 1, para.
4.
154. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 286. The treaty does not govern the use of
landmines in civil wars or other internal conflicts. Id.
155. Article 3 provides:




2. It is prohibited in all circumstances to direct weapons to which this Article applies,
either in offense, defense or by way of reprisals, against the civilian population as
such or against individual civilians.
3. The indiscriminate use of weapons to which this Article applies is prohibited.
Indiscriminate use is any placement of such weapons:
(a) Which is not on, or directed against, a military objective; or
(b) Which employs a method or means of delivery which cannot be
directed at a specific military objective; or
(c) Which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life,
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination
thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated.
4. All feasible precautions shall be taken to protect civilians from the effects of
weapons to which this Article applies. Feasible precautions are those precautions
which are tractable or practically possible taking into account all circumstances ruling
the time, including humanitarian and military considerations.
Landmine Protocol, supra note 11, art. 3.
156. Id. art. 3, para. 2.
157. Id. art. 3, para. 3.
158. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 286.
1996]
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from a mine's delayed-action operation. . . . The inadequacy of this
narrow formulation is evident. Technically, mines can be directed at a
legitimate military target as required by Article 3(3)(a) and (b). The
problem is temporality; because of their delayed-action quality, mines
essentially become indiscriminate weapons, or, at least, indiscriminate in
their effects. Article 3(3) ignores this fundamental problem."9
A balancing test was set forth that actually allows indiscriminate use of
the weapon if the expected damage is not excessive when weighed against the
direct military advantage."6 However, this test "[d]oes not offer guidance
on how to compare the potential for long-term and essentially unknowable
devastation presented by landmine use with a relatively short-term military
advantage. "1 6'
Combatants were required to take "all feasible precautions" to minimize
probable harm to civilians. 62 Even this generally protective language
contained an enormous loophole. Military commanders could justify taking
no measures at all to protect civilians by finding that none were "feasible"
under the circumstances. 63  The vagueness could have been cleared up if
the authors had required "effective" measures instead of "feasible" mea-
sures, 164 rather, the authors chose a precaution that failed to place sufficient
emphasis on future humanitarian considerations."
3. Restrictions of Non-remotely Delivered Mines
Non-remotely delivered mines 66 were prohibited in populated areas,
except when combat between ground forces is taking place or imminent,
when they are placed on or in the close vicinity of a military objective, or
when measures are taken to protect civilians.1 67 With so many exceptions,
the prohibition undercut the Protocol's mandate to avoid attacks on
civilians. 61
159. Id.
160. Landmine Protocol, supra note 11, art. 3, para. 3(c).
161. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 287.
162. Landmine Protocol, supra note 11, art. 3, para. 4.
163. Carnahan, supra note 27, at 81.
164. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 291.
165. Id. at 292.
166. Landmine Protocol, supra note 11, art. 4, para. 1.
167. Id art. 4, para. 2. Specific measures are not enumerated. Article 4 gives a short list
of examples: the posting of warning signs, the posing of sentries, the issue of warnings or the
provision of fences. Id. art. 4, para. 2(b).
168. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 296.
[Vol. 27
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4. Regulations of Remotely Delivered Mines
Remotely delivered mines 69 could be deployed only within an area
which is itself a military objective or which contains military objectives. 7°
Combatants, additionally, must comply with one of the following: they must
accurately record the location of the mines or the mines must have an
"effective neutralizing mechanism."171 Although this provision attempted
to safeguard civilians from harm, it failed to take into account that even
remotely delivered mines directed at a military objective can become
indiscriminate.72  These mines, as with all mines, may survive their
military objective.'73 Remotely delivered mines, distinctively, may miss
their mark due to the large quantities of mines dispersed and the virtual
impossibility of accurate targeting during remote delivery."'4 Finally, the
above regulations actually gave greater deference to military interest. It
mandated that the use of remotely delivered mines required "effective
advance warning" unless "circumstances do not permit."' 75 The require-
ments, therefore, allowed combatants to neglect advance warnings by reason
of unfavorable circumstances. 1
76
5. Recording and Publication
More narrow rules consumed the Landmine Protocol's recording and
publication procedures. Its provisions required that parties must record "all
preplanned minefields" 77 and should "endeavour to ensure" the recording
of all other minefields. 7 1 While this appeared to be a positive attempt to
alert civilians of minefields, practically, it is another useless requirement.
169. Landmine Protocol, supra note 11, art. 5.
170. Id. art. 5, para. 1.
171. Id. art. 5, para. l(a), (b).
Employing self-neutralizing or self-destructing mechanisms is not necessarily a more
effective alternative .... The failure rate of these mechanisms is often as high as ten
percent. . . . Self-neutralizing mines cannot confidently be handled as long as there
is any question about the effectiveness of the neutralizing feature .... Additionally,
no method exists to prevent civilian casualties before and at the moment of
self-destruction. These shortcomings of self-neutralizing or self-destructing
mechanisms further demonstrate the inadequacy of Article 5.
Smith, supra note 93, at 527-8.
172. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 300.
173. Id. at 300.
174. Id.
175. Landmine Protocol, supra note 11, art. 5, para. 2. Article 5 also fails to set forth how
to warn civilians.
176. Smith, supra note 93, at 527.
177. Landmine Protocol, supra note 11, art. 7, para. l(a). Lieutenant Colonel Burris M.
Carnahan pointed out that the term "preplanned" was intended to refer to a degree of advance
preparation beyond that covered by the word "planned." Carnahan, supra note 27, at 84.
178. Landmine Protocol, supra note 11, art. 7, para. 2.
1996]
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A preplanned minefield is ... one for which a detailed military plan exits
considerably in advance of the proposed date of execution . . . . [Sluch a
detailed military plan could not exist for the vast majority of minefields
emplaced during wartime. 79 In the heat of combat many minefields will
be created to meet immediate battlefield contingencies with little 'planning'
or 'pre-planning." 80
Aside from the fact that there is rarely ever a "pre-planned" minefield,
the few attempts that have been made to record minefields have proven
mostly inaccurate.' The passage of time and weather conditions change
the locations of mines." 2  Precise and detailed records will only prove
successful if coupled with timely mine clearance.' 83
6. Mine Clearance
The Landmine Protocol l" did not mandate mine clearance or even
make it a priority." It vaguely stated that "the parties shall endeavour to
reach agreement . . necessary to remove or otherwise render ineffective
minefields [and] mines .. .placed in position during the conflict."' This
provision has been accurately referred to as "the most questionable variant
of the rules of warfare, whose true purpose is not to 'safeguard the minimum
standard of civilization' but rather to 'cover up the inability or unwillingness
to achieve this object."87
7. Publication
Publishing the minefield's location was another conclusory attempt by
the authors to safeguard civilians. The Landmine Protocol stated that "after
the cessation of active hostilities," the parties shall "take all necessary and
appropriate measures" to "make available to each other and to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations all information in their possession
concerning the location of. . .mines ... in the territory of the adverse
179. Carnahan, supra note 27, at 84; see also DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 292-3(quoting Lieutenant Colonel Burris M. Carnahan).
180. Carnahan, supra note 27, at 84.
181. During the Falkland/Malvinas War, even though the British attempted to keep precise
and detailed maps to the mines they laid, the records proved inaccurate. DEADLY LEGACY, supra
note 2, at 292.
182. Id. at 293.
183. Id. at 293.
184. Landmine Protocol, supra note 11, art. 9.
185. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 294.
186. Landmine Protocol, supra note 11, art. 9.
187. Carnahan, supra note 27, at 82-83 (quoting 2 G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL
LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 11 (1968)).
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party."' A publication requirement could have been useful but allowing
parties to wait until "after the cessation of activities" rendered it ineffective
because such a time span ignored the temporal problem of landmine use.8 9
This requirement put civilians in grave danger because combatants were not
required to publish mines that outlive their military objective while the
conflict still persisted."9 The disclosure of mine placement after cessation
of hostilities was ineffective because many serious conflicts last over a
decade. '9'
8. Protection from the Effects of Mines
The Landmine Protocol additionally provided for a certain level of
protection for United Nations forces and missions from the effects of
mines. 192 A party was required, if requested by the head of the United
Nations force or mission to "remove or render harmless" all mines in the
area designated for peacekeeping, observation or similar functions and to take
such measures necessary to protect the forces or missions." Fact-finding
missions received a slightly lesser level of protection. For example, if the
size of the mission was too large for the party to provide adequate protection,
the party would be relieved of all duties except for the disclosure of the
locations of mines.'"
9. Production, Stockpiling, and Transfer
While the 1980 Landmine Protocol attempted to regulate landmine use,
the text did not regulate their production, stockpiling, or transfer. Manufac-
turers were permitted to produce mines in any fashion they desired; mines
that contained an anti-handling device, plastic mines that could not be
detected, or mines that looked like toys. Manufacturers were permitted to
transfer mines to whomever they chose, from a High-Contracting Party' 9
who continuously violates the Protocol to a guerrilla warfare group not
bound by it.
10. Enforcement
Neither the Weapons Convention nor the Landmine Protocol contained
enforcement mechanisms. The instrument was silent regarding who was
188. Landmine Protocol, supra note 11, art. 7, para. 3.
189. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 295.
190. Id. at 296.
191. Id.
192. Landmine Protocol, supra note 11, art. 8.
193. Id. art. 8, para. I(a), (b).
194. Id. art. 8, para. 8.
195. A High Contracting Party is a State which has ratified a treaty.
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responsible for violations of the Protocol. Any step taken to ensure
compliance would only enhance the effectiveness of the obligations pertaining
to landmine use. 9
6
E. Conclusion
The authors of the Landmine Protocol believed that with appropriate
restrictions on landmine use in place, the necessary balance between
humanitarian and military considerations could be achieved. 9 ' The
Landmine Protocol, however, failed to deal effectively with the problems of
temporal indiscriminateness inherent in landmine use. The instrument failed
for the following reasons: it only regulated landmine use, it failed to confront
the indiscriminate effects mines cause, it required only recording pre-planned
minefields, it is only applied to international conflicts, and it lacked any
enforcement measures to guarantee compliance with the obligations it sets
out. Taken together, these numerous flaws rendered the 1980 Landmine
Protocol, in theory and in practice, completely ineffective to promote any
customary humanitarian principles to protect civilians and non-combatants
from the intricacies of landmines.
III. REVIEW CONFERENCE
Because of the ineffectiveness of the Landmine Protocol, a comprehen-
sive review conference was established to reconsider the instrument. Its
governing sentiment was to adopt a treaty that would totally ban the
production, possession, and use of landmines.' 9' After two years of
negotiations, the Review Conference failed to secure such a global ban. It
did, however, adopt stricter restrictions regulating landmine use, production,
and transfer.
A. Events That Led To The Final Report
Coupled with the ineffective Landmine Protocol, the human wreckage
resulting from the accumulation of mines world wide was too great to be
ignored. In 1991, non-governmental organizations, such as the International
Committee of the Red Cross, the Arms Project of Human Rights Watch, and
Physicians for Human Rights, became the leaders of the international
campaign for a global ban on landmines. 99 They insisted that even the
196. Lord, supra note 19, at 345.
197. Id.; DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at 297.
198. A number of High-Contracting Parties, non-parties, and organizations such as the
International Committee of the Red Cross banded together to request a Review Conference
pursuant to the Weapons Convention Article 8. Review Conference, supra note 25, at 4.
199. DEADLY LEGACY, supra note 2, at xi; Gerd-Eckhard Zehm, "Perverse" Weapons:
Regulation on Mines Face Review, DEUTSCHE PRESS-AGENTUR, Sept. 22, 1995.
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most stringent possible regulations would not solve the growing crisis. The
Review Conference resulted from their continued persistence.
In 1993, States parties to the Weapons Convention formally requested
the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene a Conference of the
High Contracting Parties to review the provisions of the Weapons Conven-
tion, in particular, the Landmine Protocol. 200 As a result of this request,
the United Nations scheduled the first phase of the Review Conference in the
Fall of 1995. 201 The U.N. General Assembly called upon the maximum
number of states and invited interested non-governmental organizations, in
particular the International Committee for the Red Cross, to attend the
conference.2
Non-governmental organizations (NGO's), however, were not the only
advocates for a global ban. The Review Conference and its preparatory
process played an "indispensable role in focusing government attention on the
need for action to stop the killing and maiming caused by landmines." 203
Just prior to the Review Conference, U.N. Secretary-General, Buotros
Buotros-Ghali, called for a total ban on the production and use of landmines
even though it was unlikely to get full backing from the states parties to the
Convention.' Belgium became the first country to pass a law banning the
production, export, and use of landmines. 20 Eight States had suspended
or renounced landmine use by their own armed forces. 20 Australia and
Germany completely banned their armed forces from using mines.'
Additionally, more than 30 nations endorsed the view that the only way to
solve the catastrophic problems caused by landmines is to ban them
totally."
Upon commencement of the Review Conference, the participants
exchanged their general views. "When the floor was opened for the press
and the world, country after country decried the use of landmines and called
200. Review Conference, supra note 25, at 4.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Summary Record of the 11th Meeting, Review Conference of the States Parties to the
Convention of Prohibitions or Restriction on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which
May Be Deemed To Be Excessively Injurious or To Have Indiscriminate Effects, at 3, U.N. Doc.
CCW/CONF.IISR.I 1 3 (Part 2) (1996) [hereinafter Summary Record II].
204. Steve Pagani, UN. Vienna Conference Set to Curb Use of Landmines, REUTERS N. AM.
WIRE, Sept. 24,1995 [hereinafter UN. Vienna].
205. Id.
206. Summary Record 11, supra note 203, at 3.
207. US. Expects Accord on Limiting Landmine Use, REUTERS N. A. WIRE, Apr. 16, 1996
[hereinafter US. Expects].
208. Robert Evans, "Don't Miss Your Chance," Conference on Landmines is Told,
DEUTSCHE PRESS-AGENTUR, Apr. 23, 1996; As of January 16, 1996, the States that backed an
immediate ban included NATO alliance members Belgium, Denmark, Iceland, and Norway, as
well as Austria, Cambodia, Colombia, Estonia, Ireland, Laos, Malaysia, Mexico, Mozambique,
New Zealand, Nicaragua, Philippines, Peru, Slovenia, Sweden and Uruguay. Campaigners
Demand Global Landmine Ban, REUTERS N. AM. WIRE, Jan. 16, 1996 [hereinafter Campaigners].
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for a rigid regime. " ' NGO activists report that once the doors were
closed to the world, however, country after country began reneging on
earlier stances .21 The Review Conference was dominated by three issues
regarding landmines: expanding the scope to include internal conflicts,",
the inclusion of verification and compliance mechanisms, and coming up with
restrictions on the use and production of mines.212 While there was a
general agreement prior to the conference to expand the scope to include
internal conflicts, views clashed as to what kind of internal conflicts should
be included. 23 Because countries such as China, India, and Mexico define
some armed conflicts as terrorism, they opposed the expansion of the scope
to include all conflicts .214
Disagreement also arose as well regarding verification and compliance
mechanisms. Proponents argued a verification commission should be
established to document violations.215 Opponents argued a commission
would hinder broader adherence to the Weapons Convention and possibly
make it counter-productive. They also claimed non-signatories would be
discouraged from ratifying the Weapons Convention. 216 A small group of
nations opposed extensive verification and compliance mechanisms.2 17
Further, while Western governments favored a tougher mechanism,
developing countries feared such mechanisms would infringe on national
sovereignty.2 Is
Disputes arose regarding restrictions on the use, export, and production
of landmines. The parties expressed many views on whether to impose a
total ban. 219  Because such differences precluded even the possibility of a
total ban, the main focus became a quest for more limited restrictions.'
This too became the subject of much debate. Agreement could not be
reached. 22'
The participants held different views on issues such as making mines
detectable, self-destructive, self-activating, and how such requirements might
209. Senthil Ratnasabapathy, Disarmament: Two Days to Go at Landmine Meeting, Still No
Accord, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Oct. 11, 1995 [hereinafter Two Days].
210. Two Days, supra note 209.
211. Id.
212. Senthil Ratnasabapathy, Disarmament: UN Meet To Ponder Ban On Landmines, INTER
PRESS SERVICE, Sept. 25, 1995 [hereinafter UN. Meet].
213. Two Days, supra note 209.
214. Id.
215. UN. Meet, supra note 212..
216. Senthil Ratnasabapathy, Disarmament: Delegates Hassle, Critics Complain Over
Landmine Ban, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Oct. 9, 1995 [hereinafter Delegates]. More than two-thirds
of the countries have not signed the convention. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Summary Record I1, supra note 203, at 2-11.
220. Id.
221. Two Days, supra note 209.
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affect the huge stockpiles of mines held by many countries. 222 For exam-
ple, during the negotiations, there was a general agreement that all
antipersonnel landmines should be detectable, but disagreement as to the
requisite grams of metal required for detection arose.2' Once eight grams
was agreed upon, the question of what to do with existing mines not in
compliance became an issue.' Although a complete ban seemed hopeless,
additional tension arose when some countries expressed a desire to ban
certain types of mines. India, for example, who had originally called for a
total ban on remotely delivered mines, was forced to call instead for a
restriction because there was no support for ban.'
The Review Conference's continued disagreement stemmed from a
number of factors. The underlying problem was the difference in views on
the legal status of the weapon. While the NGO's viewed landmines as
illegitimate weapons in violation of humanitarian law, the governments
viewed landmines as legitimate weapons for military use.226 Some of the
largest mine producers and mine users were not willing to consider the
possibility of the total elimination of mines. 22  Although most Western
nations supported their elimination, they did not believe that the time was
ripe to push for a complete ban.
Additionally, humanitarian concerns were not the only focus of the
negotiations. Financial, military, and political concerns were said to have
taken priority over human wreckage. 22  For example, NGO activists
claimed some states seemed determined to draft language that would place
their own weapon programs out of danger. Developing nations contended
that the Western nations efforts to destroy dumb mines were backed by a
commercial incentive to render their expensive high-tech mines more
marketable.2 9
When the Review Conference came to an end, the participants found
themselves far apart on the key issues and in need for additional time to
complete its work on the Landmine Protocol. 23 The Conference decided
that it would continue in resumed sessions to be held in the first half of 1996.
Its goal was to conclude the review and the amendment process of the
Landmine Protocol.23l
Discussion for an outright ban on landmines was not even on the agenda
222. Campaigners, supra note 208. US. Expects, supra note 207.
223. Delegates, supra note 217.
224. Senthil Ratnasabapathy, Disarmament: Good Guys, Bad Guys and the Business of
Landmines, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Oct. 16, 1995 [hereinafter Good Guys].
225. Campaigners, supra note 208.
226. Delegates, supra note 216.
227. Campaigners, supra note 208.
228. Two Days, supra note 209.
229. Good Guys, supra note 224.
230. Review Conference, supra note 25, at 6.
231. The resumed sessions were held from January 15, 1996 through the 19th and from
April 22, 1996 through May 3. Id.
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when the conference reconvened. 232  The international lobbying effort,
however, finally began to produce positive results. The participants agreed
upon stricter restrictions regarding the use, export, and production.
Measures included eliminating mines that are nondetectable, limiting exports,
technical assistance for mine clearance, and prohibiting mine use during
internal conflicts.
B. The Final Report of the Review Conference:
The Amended Landmine Protocol
On May 3, 1996, the Review Conference adopted by consensus the
Amended Landmine Protocol.1 3  U.N. Secretary-General, Buotros-Ghali
remarked the progress achieved fell "far short of what [he] had hoped."'
During the concluding statements of the conference, a delegate from the
International Campaign to Ban Landmines stated that he thought that "the
work of the United Nations was to forge unity between countries, not
weapons to divide them."" The Final Report does little to prohibit
landmine use, export, and production. It consists, alternatively, of a plethora
of restrictions.
1. Scope and Application
The participants to the Review Conference expanded the scope of
application to include internal conflicts. However, the amended protocol
does not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions that are not
considered armed conflict.236 Such situations include riots, isolated and
sporadic acts of violence, and other acts of similar nature.23 7 Additionally,
non-parties are bound by the protocol if the armed conflict occurs in the
territory of a High Contracting Party.23 8 Developing countries' feared that
the expansion to internal conflict would lead to infringement on their national
sovereignty. In order to curb this fear, the amended Landmine Protocol
prohibits any part of the protocol to be invoked for the purpose of affecting
the sovereignty of a State or the responsibility of the Government to maintain
law and order or to defend the national unity and territorial integrity.239
232. US. Expects, supra note 207.
233. Review Conference, supra note 25, at 11.
234. Summary Record of the 14th Meeting, Review Conference of the States Parties to the
Convention of Prohibitions or Restriction on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which
May Be Deemed To Be Excessively Injurious or To Have Indiscriminate Effects, at 7, U.N. Doc.
CCW/CONF.I/SR14 29 (Part 2)(1996) [hereinafter Summary Record 14].
235. Id
236. Review Conference, supra note 25, at 14, Annex B, art. 1, para. 2.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 16, Annex B, art. 3.
239. Id. at 15, Annex B, art. 1, para. 4.
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2. Restrictions on the Use of Mines
a. General Restrictions. While allowing the old restrictions to remain
virtually unchanged, the participants of the Review Conference added
provisions concerning parties responsibilities, effective advanced warnings,
and technological prohibitions.2 ° Each party to a conflict is responsible
for all mines employed by it and must undertake to clear, remove, destroy,
or maintain them under the terms specified in the amended protocol. 241
Effective advanced warning of emplacement of mines is required, unless
circumstances do not permit.242 The 1980 Landmine Protocol contained the
same provision regarding remotely delivered mines. The provision was said
to give greater deference to military interest because it actually allows
combatants to neglect advance warnings by reason of unfavorable circum-
stances.2" The implementation of this provision illustrates that the partici-
pants military interests still dominate.
The general restrictions were further expanded to prohibit the use of
certain mines. For example, it prohibits self-deactivating mines equipped
with an anti-handling device designed to make the mine capable of exploding
after the mine has ceased to function. 2' Mines which employ a mechanism
specifically designed to detonate the munition in the presence of commonly
240. Id. at 16-17, Annex B, art. 3.
241. Id. art. 3, para. 2. The terms are set forth in Article 10. Article 10 reads in its
entirety:
1. Without delay after the cessation of active hostilities, all minefields, mined areas,
mines, booby-traps and other devices shall be cleared, removed, destroyed or
maintained in accordance with Article 3 and paragraph 2 of Article 5 of this Protocol.
2. High Contracting Parties and parties to a conflict bear such responsibility with
respect to minefields, mined areas, mines, booby-traps and other devices in areas
under their control.
3. With respect to minefields, mined areas, mines, booby-traps and other devices laid
by a party in area over which it no longer exercises control, such party shall provide
to the party in control of the area pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article, to the extent
permitted by such party, technical and material assistance necessary to fulfill such
responsibility.
4. At all times necessary, the parties shall endeavour to reach agreement, both among
themselves and, where appropriate, with other States and with international
organizations, on the provision of technical and material assistance, including, in
appropriate circumstances, the undertaking of joint operations necessary to fulfil such
responsibilities.
Review Conference, supra note 25, at art. 10.
242. Id. at 18, Annex B, art. 3(11).
243. Smith, supra note 93, at 526.
244. Review Conference, supra note 25, at 17, Annex B, art. 3, para. 6.
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available mine detectors are prohibited as well.' 5
b. Restriction on the Use of Antipersonnel Mines other than Remotely
Delivered Mines. Restrictions on the use of antipersonnel mines other than
remotely delivered mines are undercut by exceptions.' These provisions
prohibit the use of mines that do not have self-destruction or self-deactivation
mechanisms unless mines are placed within a perimeter-marked area, the area
is monitored by military personnel and protected by fencing, 7 and the
mines are cleared before the area is abandoned. 48 The party is relieved
of the duty to clear the area if it is turned over to the forces of another state
and that state accepts the responsibility for maintaining the mines. 9 A
party will also be relieved of the above duties if such compliance is "not
feasible due to forcible loss of control of the area as a result of enemy
military action." 5 0 While the parties who laid the mines are required to
monitor and protect the area, the party who gains control of the area is only
required to the "maximum extent feasible" to maintain and if necessary,
establish protections."
c. Restrictions on the Use of Remotely Delivered Mines. On its face, the
amended protocol prohibits the use of remotely delivered mines."25 These
mines can be used, however, if they contain self-destruction or
self-neutralization mechanisms and have a back up self-deactivation feature,
245. Id. art. 3, para. 5. Similarly, non-detectable mines are prohibited unless their use is
in compliance with the Technical Annex (2). Id. at 18, art. 4. The Technical Annex (2) reads
in its entirety:
(a) With respect to anti-personnel mines produced after 1 January 1997, such mines
shall incorporate in their construction a material or device that enables the mine to be
detected by commonly-available technical mine detection equipment and provides a
response signal equivalent to a signal from 8 grammes or more of iron in a single
coherent mass.
(b) With respect to anti-personnel mines produced before 1 January 1997, such mines
shall either incorporate in their construction, or have attached prior to their
emplacement, in a manner not easily removable, a material or device that enables the
mine to be detected by commonly-available technical mine detection equipment and
provides a response signal equivalent to a signal from 8 grammes or more of iron in
a single coherent mass.
(c) In the event that a High Contracting Party determines that it cannot immediately
comply with sub-paragraph (b) it may declare at the time of its notification of consent
to be bound by the Protocol that it will defer compliance with sub-paragraph (b) for
a period not to exceed 9 years from the entry into force of this Protocol. In the
meantime it shall, to the extent feasible, minimize the use of anti-personnel mines that
do not so comply.
246. Id. at 18, art. 5.
247. Id. at 18, art. 5, para. 2(a).
248. Id. at 18, art. 5, para. 2(b).
249. Id. at 18, art. 5, para. 3.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 18, art. 5, para. 4.
252. Id. at 19, art. 6, para. I.
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which is designed so that the mine will not function as a mine when the the
military purpose for which it was placed does not exist.253 Consistent with
the old instrument, "effective advanced warning" must be given if delivered
or dropped mines may affect the civilian population, unless circumstances do
not permit.' This amendment gives greater deference to the parties'
military interest than it does to civilian tragedy.
d. Restrictions Regarding the Transfer of Mines. Each High Contracting
Party agrees not to transfer any mine in which the use is prohibited by the
protocol. 2" The parties also agree not to transfer mines to any recipient
other than a State or a State agency authorized to receive such transfers .256
The parties additionally agree not to transfer any antipersonnel mines to
States which are not bound by the protocol, unless the recipient State agrees
to follow it. 7  The amended protocol also includes a provision dealing
with immediate transfers by requiring parties to refrain from any actions
which would be inconsistent with transferring the prohibited mines."
3. Recording, Use of Information, and Removal of
Minefields and Mines Areas
The participants of the Review Conference agreed to a considerable
change in the recording and publication requirements for landmines. The
Amended Landmine Protocol expanded the recording requirement from
"pre-planned minefields" to all minefields, mined areas, and mines. Parties
are required to record the location of mines on maps, diagrams, or other
records accurately by relation to two coordinates and the estimated dimen-
sions of the area containing these weapons in relation to those reference
points." The records, additionally, must contain complete information
such as the mine type, number, emplacing method, type of fuse and life
time, date and time of laying, anti-handling devices, and other relevant
information on all weapons laid. 2' For mines produced after the amended
protocol's entry into force, the originating country's name, the month and
year of production, and the serial or lot number must be marked in English
or in the respective national language.21
The mine removal requirements of the old Landmine Protocol which did
not make mine clearance mandatory or even a priority were changed. The
253. Id. at 19, art. 6, para. 2(3).
254. Id. at 19, art. 6, para. 4.
255. Id. at 20, art. 8, para. I(a).
256. Id. at 20, art. 8, para. I(b).
257. Id. at 21-22, art. 8, para. 1(c).
258. Id. at 21, art. 8, para. 3.
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amended protocol now requires parties to clear, remove, destroy, or maintain
all minefields, mined areas, and mines. The parties to a conflict are
responsible for the areas under their control and shall endeavor to reach
agreements regarding their responsibilities.263
4. Technical Cooperation and Assistance
The High Contracting Parties to the amended Landmine Protocol set
forth duties regarding technical cooperation and assistance.' 6 The Amend-
ed Protocol provides that, without prejudice to constitutional and other legal
provisions, "each High Contracting Party undertakes to facilitate and shall
have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment,
material, scientific, and technological information concerning the implemen-
tation of this protocol and means of mine clearance."'265 The parties agree
to provide information and assistance, and have the right to seek and receive
technical assistance, other than weapons technology.2' Although the
participants did not mandate to cooperatation and assistance regarding
technological information, they have made it a priority.
5. Protection from Effects of Minefields, Mined Areas, and Mines
The High Contracting Parties or parties to a conflict must, so far as they
are able, take such measures as are necessary to protect all forces or missions
from the effects of mines in any area under its control.267 Other duties,
however, vary depending on who controls the forces or missions. With the
exception of the United Nations peace-keeping forces or missions, protection
is afforded only to forces or missions which are performing functions in an
area with the consent of the party whose territory the functions are per-
formed.268 Similar to the old Landmine Protocol, the United Nations
forces and missions receive a greater level of protection such as the
disclosure of all information regarding the location of minefields.69
Parties who consent to the presence of other forces or missions, at the very
least, must take measures so far as it is able to provide protection and they
may have to remove or render harmless any mines in the area.27°
All information provided in confidence to the recipient must be kept in
strict confidence and must not be released outside the force or mission
262. Id. at 22, art. 10, para. 1.
263. Id. at 22, art. 10, para. 4.
264. Id. at 22, art. 11.
265. Id. at 22, art. 11, para. 1.
266. Id. at 23, art. 1I, para. 7.
267. Id. at 24, art. 12, para. 2(b)(i).
268. Id. at 23, art. 12, para. 1(a).
269. Id. at 24, art. 12, para. 2(b)(iii).
270. Id at 24, art. 12, para. 2(b)(i).
[Vol. 27
30
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 27, No. 1 [1996], Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol27/iss1/4
THE 1996 AMENDED LANDMINE PROTOCOL
without express authorization of the provider of the information. 27' Forces
and missions must, additionally, respect the laws and regulations of the host
State and refrain from any action or activity incompatible with the impartial
and international nature of their duties.2' The mine infested countries,
such as Cambodia, welcomed the inclusion of the greater protection for
humanitarian mine clearance operations.273
6. Compliance and Consultations
The participants of the Review Conference introduced compliance
procedures to the Landmine Protocol. The amended protocol now requires
parties to take appropriate steps, including legislative and other measures, to
prevent and suppress violations on their territory.274 These measures
include the imposition of penal sanctions against persons who, in the context
of armed conflict and contrary to the amended provisions, willfully kill or
cause serious injury to civilians.275 It further requires parties to train their
armed forces commensurately with the provisions of the amended proto-
col 276
The instrument also requires parties to consult each other to resolve
problems that may arise with regard to interpretation and application of the
amended protocol.2' It mandates that for the purpose of consultation and
cooperation, a conference of the High Contracting Parties be held annual-
ly.27 The provisions set forth a list of work that should be done at this
conference.279 Finally, the amended Landmine Protocol states that the costs
of the conference will be borne by any states, non-parties alike, participating
in the work of the conference.28
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF THE FINAL REPORT: DOES THE FINAL REPORT
OVERCOME THE FLAWS OF THE 1980 LANDMINE PROTOCOL?
Because the Landmine Protocol failed to deal effectively with the
271. Id. at 25, art. 12, para. 6.
272. Id. at 25-26, art. 12, para. 7(a), (b).
273. Summary Record 14, supra note 236, at 4.
274. Review Conference, supra note 25, at 27, Annex B, art. 14, para. 1.
275. Id. at 27, art. 14, para. 2.
276. Id. at 27, art. 14, para. 3.
277. Id. at 27, art. 14, para. 4.
278. Id. at 26, art. 13, para. 1.
279. Id. at 26., art. 13, para. 3. The work includes the following: a review of the protocol's
operation and status, preparation for review conferences, consideration of the development of
technology that will protect civilians against the indiscriminate effects of mines, and the
preparation of annual reports to the U.N. which will circulate them to all High Contracting
Parties. The annual reports should include matters such as mine clearance and rehabilitation
programs, legislation related to the protocol, and dissemination of information on the protocol
to the parties armed forces and civilian populations.
280. Id. at 26, art. 13, para. 5.
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problems of temporal indiscriminateness inherent in landmine use, the
Review Conference was established. Campaigners for a global ban had
hoped that the conference would deal effectively with the Landmine
Protocol's numerous flaws as set forth above. The final report represents a
compromise, but "many of its provisions [will] remain a subject of legal
speculations. "'
The most significant change in the Landmine Protocol is the expansion
of its scope to include internal armed conflicts. One of the 1980 Landmine
Protocol's major flaws was that it applied only to interstate wars and wars
of national liberation. This change is significant because mines are chiefly
used in civil wars and wars are increasingly civil (as opposed to internation-
al). Presently, forty countries are engaged in civil strife.' The number
is expected to rise to sixty by the turn of the century (which would mean that
every third country in the world would be affected by a civil war). 213
All internal conflicts, however, are not governed by the amended
protocol. Civilians can therefore be terrorized with mines in situations that
are not considered armed conflict. Because parties are given the discretion
to define conflicts as mere "internal disturbances," the article is subject to
interpretation. The provision allows mines to be used in situations such as
riots, sporadic acts of violence, and other incidents of similar nature.'
Nevertheless, because it applies to warfare in the context of non-international
armed conflicts, the amended Landmine Protocol has a more effective scope
of application. 2"
Another significant change in the Landmine Protocol is that it has been
amended to not only regulate mine use but also mine transfers and
production. It is debatable, however, how effective these new regulations
will be. While the instrument is not silent on the issue of mines transfers,
it merely imposes an obligation to refrain from any transfer of mines whose
use is prohibited. The Article does not legally bind the parties from
transferring mines to non-parties who may not comply with the protocol.
Some parties stress a commitment to observe all restrictions to the fullest
extent possible and to refrain from any transfer inconsistent with the purpose
of the amended Landmine Protocol. Not all parties, however, accept this
political commitment. Until the transfer of mines whose use violates the
amended Landmine Protocol is completely prohibited, agreeing to "under-
take" not to transfer mines inconsistent with the protocol will not effectively
promote the purpose of the Review Conference.
The international community demonstrated its willingness to regulate the
281. Summary Record 14, supra note 234, at 21.
282. U.N. Meet, supra note 212.
283. Id.
284. For example, in India, a police officer was killed and six other people were wounded
in a landmine blast as voters went to the polls in the state of Bihar. Such election-related
violence is not prohibited by the Final Report. Police Officer Killed in Landmine Blast in Bihar,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, May 7, 1996.
285. Lord, supra note 19, at 344.
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production of landmines by requiring mines to be manufactured with
self-destruction and self-deactivation mechanisms. The Technical Annex,
however, sets forth complicated and tedious specifications on these
mechanisms. It allows one out of ten mines to be designed to fail in the
self-destruction process with a goal that the back-up self-deactivation feature
will work so that no more than one in one thousand activated mines will
function. With more than 2.5 million mines laid each year, the number of
mines whose mechanisms fail are quite substantial considering the number
of human lives at stake.
The amended Landmine Protocol further prohibits the use of mines
which are not in compliance with the provisions on self-destruction and
self-deactivation. This prohibition, however, is engulfed by exceptions. It
actually condones the use of prohibited mines so long as they are monitored
and cleared before the area is abandoned. It further relieves the party who
laid them of any duty if compliance becomes "not feasible." Like the
original protocol, this word choice allows combatants to justify
non-compliance with any reason. The use and production of mines with
additional mechanisms, although mandated, can easily be avoided through
exceptions.
Additionally, the amended Landmine Protocol does not effectively dealt
with the major flaw of the previous instrument: the indiscriminate effect of
landmines. The protocol condones the use, transfer, and production of more
technologically advanced mines but does not prohibit the use or transfer of
existing mines other than, arguably, non-detectable mines. Non-detectable
mines will be allowed for another nine years if a party determines that it
cannot immediately comply with the requirement to incorporate a detectable
mechanism in mines already produced or produced before January 1,
1997. 6 These parties are required, to the extent "feasible," to minimize
the use of these mines. 2" Instead of entirely prohibiting the use of an
indiscriminate weapon, the revised protocol allows the continued use of
non-detectable mines and condones the use of new models which have
virtually the same indiscriminate effects, even if the effects are short
term.2 s8
Recording procedures and mine removal, conversely, have been dealt
with effectively, although concern arises regarding whether they are actually
viable. The revised protocol contains an optimistic list of recording and
removal requirements. During a heated conflict, it is doubtful that any of
these requirements will be followed. 9 As evidenced by previous actions,
286. Review Conference, supra note 25, at 29, Tech. Annex 2(b)-2(c).
287. Id. at 29, Tech. Annex 2(c).
288. Summary Record 14, supra note 236, at 6.
289. To demonstrate this vagrancy, despite a cease fire and peace talks between the Angolan
government and UNITA rebels, fighting still persisted and new landmines continued to be laid.
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it is equally doubtful whether the international community will be able to
implement these requirements successfully.
Finally, another major flaw of the 1980 Landmine Protocl was that it
lacked enforcement mechanisms. While many advocated for a verification
commission, the final report, in reality, only consists of vague measures of
enforcement. Compliance has been left in the hands of the High Contracting
Parties. Because the revised protocol is laced with exceptions and loopholes,
a compliance investigation mechanism was essential. A body should have
been established within the United Nations that could ensure compliance with
the provisions and take appropriate measures against any party who violated
them. Whether states will comply with their obligation to take appropriate
steps to prevent and suppress violations is questionable.2'
In sum, the revised protocol does not effectively deal with the problem
of temporal indiscriminateness inherent in mine warfare. It fails to regulate
effectively the use, production, and transfer of landmines. It requires
methods of recording and removal which are too complicated to comply
with. Finally, it fails to provide adequate enforcement mechanisms. The
Final Report of the Review Conference therefore fails to overcome the major
flaws of the 1980 Landmine Protocol that it was primarily intended to
remedy.
CONCLUSION
The governing problem of the 1980 Landmine Protocol and the Final
Report is that neither effectively address the problem at hand: the growing
landmine crisis and its effect on civilians. The same strategy is perennially
adopted to deal with this crisis. Instead of placing landmines outside the law,
governments and the military work long and hard to continue to make room
for them within the law.29' Landmines are not the first weapons to be
placed within the law. For centuries, governments and militaries have
prioritized methods of warfare over humanitarian concerns. They have
implemented laws governing which weapons not to use and how not to use
them. However, modern military technology has continuously side stepped
this strategy by creating new weaponry to which the law does not apply.
A Western perspective clearly dominates this comment's moral posture.
Such posture may result from the abundance of weapons choices afforded to
the Western world. When placed in the greater context of Western
weaponry, landmines are easily disposable. It is important to note that in
developing countries, landmines may be the only weapon choice available.
If this perspective can permeate the remainder of the Westerners who use
landmines, then perhaps the Western community as a whole will be able to
290. Id. The delegate from Afghanistan expressed his concern regarding the Soviet Union's
irresponsible actions in lacing Afghanistan with mines. He doubted whether anyone would dare
turn them in. Summary Record 14, supra note 234, at 5.
291. Summary Record 14, supra note 234, at 7.
[Vol. 27
34
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 27, No. 1 [1996], Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol27/iss1/4
THE 1996 AMENDED LANDMINE PROTOCOL
understand and prevent the circumstances under which developing countries
are deploying these weapons of massive long-term devastation.
In reality, the Final Report is only part of the process that will bring
about the total ban on landmines. The Landmine Review Conference has
given rise to an increased global awareness. Landmines are not only being
stigmatized around the world by the public but also by many governments.
With international cooperation and unilateral actions by governments, the
scourge of landmines and the human wreckage they cause can be put to rest.
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